Tasavvuf erbâbı tabîatleri gereği mâddî unsurlardan ziyâde mânevî değerleri muhafaza etmeye ve geliştirmeye çalışırlar. Fakat tasavvufî çevrelerin sosyal bir yapıya bürünmeleriyle berâber düşüncelerini ve değerlerini sembolize etmek için mâddî bir kısım edevât da kullanmışlardır. Bunların başında keşkül, teber, tahta kılıç, asâ, gül, hırka gibi unsular gelir. Bu çalışmamızda dervîşlerin kullandıkları mâddî edevâttan birisi olan tahta kılıç ve ifâde ettiği mânâlara bakacağız ve örnekler üzerinden tahlîl etmeye çalışacağız. Tasavvuf ehli tahta kılıç ile ilgili bir hadîs-i şerîfden yola çıkarak (...) mânevî bir disiplin, ahlakî bir prensip ve nefsânî bir terbiye metodu ortaya koymuşlardır. Yeri geldiğinde cihâd ve mücâhede için zāhir kılıcının yanı sıra bâtın kılıcını kullanmışlardır. Manevî kılıcı sembolize eden tahta kılıcın kullanımına dâir tespit ettiğimiz ilk örnek sahābe döneminde Muhammed b. Mesleme’ye aittir. Yaygın bir şekilde kullanımı ise 1200’lü yıllarda büyük tarîkatların kurulduğu dönemde yânî Abbâsî hilâfeti döneminde olmuştur. Memlüklü dönemi kaynaklarından okuduğumuz kadarıyla Yûsuf Selahaddîn-i Eyyûbî ve berâberindeki kalabalık dervîş gurubu bu unsuru yaygın olarak kullanmışladır. Yûsuf Selahaddîn Eyyûbî’nin hem Bağdâd’ta iken hem de Mısır’a sefer düzenlerken berâberindeki kalabalık derviş gurubuyla birlikte zikirler eşliğinde tahta kılıçla yürüdükleri kaydedilmiştir. Bektâşî Velâyetnâmelerinde Anadolu Selçukluları döneminde yaşayan Hacı Bektâş-i Velî’nin himmetleriyle Saru Saltuk’un tahta kılıç kullanarak mânevî bir savaş verdiğini görüyoruz. Velâyet-nâmelerde tahta kılıç kullanımına dâir pek çok örnek vardır. 20 yüzyılda da pek çok dergâh ve câmîde bu tür bir kılıcın sembolik olarak kullanıldığını bizzât müşâhede ettik. (shrink)

Prof. Berna Arda, is a graduate of Ankara University Faculty of Medicine 1987, has medical specialty and PhD degrees in History of Medicine and Ethics and, teaches at the Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine in Ankara University Faculty of Medicine, Ankara, Turkey. Her main research and publication fields are science ethics, human rights, woman and bioethics, medical law, ethics education and disease concept in history of medicine. She was a visiting scientist at Boston Children’s Hospital and (...) Harvard Medical School, between February - July 2015 and a guest professor at the University College of London, History of Medicine Center, between January and June 2008. She is the founder chairperson of Turkish Bioethics Society, Member of High Disciplinary Committee of Turkish Medical Association. Governor, Vice President and Executive Committee member of World Association for Medical Law, one of the founders and the first president of International Association for Education in Ethics. (shrink)

Almaatouq et al. claim that the integrative experiment design can help “develop a reliable, cohesive, and cumulative theoretical understanding.” I will contest this claim by challenging three underlying assumptions about the nature of scientific theories. I propose that the integrative experiment design should be viewed as an exploratory framework rather than a means to build or evaluate theories.

Publication ethics, an important subtopic of science ethics, deals with determination of the misconducts of science in performing research or in the dissemination of ideas, data and products. Science, the main features of which are secure, reliable and ethically obtained data, plays a major role in shaping the society. As long as science maintains its quality by being based on reliable and ethically obtained data, it will be possible to maintain its role in shaping the society. This article is devoted (...) to the presentation of opinions of PhD candidate students in health sciences in Ankara concerning publication ethics. The data obtained from 143 PhD students from the fields of medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and veterinary reveal limited but unique experiences. It also shows that plagiarism is one of the worst issues in the publication ethics from the perspective of these young academics. (shrink)

Quelles sont les formes modernes de la croyance en l'image et de quelle manière le cinéma, la photographie, l'art-vidéo, travaillent sur les frontières de l'expérimentation et des mutations théoriques de l'image ?

The 21st century, in which science and technology developed with great acceleration, made the physical and social distances between people more permeable with the effect of globalization inherited from the previous century. In such an age where everybody is aware of everything, not only positive developments but also all kinds of information, beliefs and actions that may be considered negative for humanity can instantly spread and become widespread all over the world. For example, the adoption of attitudes and behaviors that (...) do not correspond to human values such as consumption, selfishness, narcissism, vanity, arrogance, humiliation, mockery, especially among young people, is worrisome. It is a fact that the generation Z, who was born in the lap of technology, is vulnerable to technology and more susceptible to its damages. In today's world, which is also defined as the age of technology and information, young people can be exposed to all kinds of written and visual information pollution via the internet. Moreover, this situation paves the way for negative attitudes and behaviors such as waste of time and energy, consumption habits, addiction, estrangement from values, alienation, problem of belonging, dissatisfaction among young people. For this reason, this age is polluting the young people not only mentally but also spiritually. Not only the individual themself but also societies have to pay the bill for the inability to satisfy the material and spiritual dimension of the human in a healthy and appropriate manner. For this reason, the education of the new generation is a duty on the family, educators, non-governmental organizations and society as a whole. One of the first and most important steps to be taken in order to protect young people from all these adverse developments and to ensure their participation in the society as a healthy individual is undoubtedly their upbringing with moral values. Because values are the preconditions for a young person to exist as an adult with personality, morality, responsibility, sensitivity to the other and their environment, and who has discovered their own meaning and importance in the world. Therefore, knowing the spiritual-humanistic values of young people, who are the guarantors of the future, will give adults an idea about predicting today and the future and taking necessary measures. The aim of this study is; to determine the spiritual-humanistic value tendencies of high school students. The research was conducted on a total of 450 students studying at different types of high schools in the province of Sinop in the 2019-2020 academic year. The research data was collected through questionnaires and scales from quantitative research methods were analyzed according to age, gender, class, economic status, perception of success, family structure, family attitude perception, duration of social media use and social media usage purpose variables. According to the results of the research, the students got the highest average score (4.28) from moral values and the lowest average score (3.19) from respect value. There is a positive correlation between all dimensions of the spiritual-humanistic values disposition scale. Mann Witney U-Test and Kruskal Wallis H-Test, which are non-parametric tests, were used in the analysis of the scale that did not show normal distribution. According to the test results, there was no relationship between the sub-dimensions of the scale; moral values, love, respect and sensitivity mean scale score and gender, age, perception of success, family attitude perception, duration of social media use and social media use purpose variables, because p> 0.05. However, there was a significant correlation between the point average of moral tendency of the sample group and school type, mother education and father education; between the average score of love value and the school type variable; respect value average score and class, school type, perceived economic situation and mother education; between the mean score of sensitivity value and the variable of family structure (p <0.05). (shrink)

The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience (...) machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.How to Use the Experience MachineVolume 28, Issue 3EDEN LIN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820815000424Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. How to Use the Experience MachineVolume 28, Issue 3EDEN LIN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820815000424Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. How to Use the Experience MachineVolume 28, Issue 3EDEN LIN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820815000424Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Contains twenty-one of the papers presented at the 3rd Islam and Bioethics International Conference held April 14-16, 2010, in Manavgat, Antalya, Turkey.

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In (...) the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive. (shrink)

Invariabilism is the view that the same theory of welfare is true of every welfare subject. Variabilism is the view that invariabilism is false. In light of how many welfare subjects there are and how greatly they differ in their natures and capacities, it is natural to suppose that variabilism is true. I argue that these considerations do not support variabilism and, indeed, that we should accept invariabilism. This has important implications: it eliminates many of the going theories of welfare (...) while making some of the remaining ones more attractive. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that subjectivists about welfare must claim that the favorable attitudes whose satisfaction is relevant to your well-being are those that you would have in idealized conditions (e.g. ones in which you are fully informed and rational). I argue that this is false. I introduce a non-idealizing subjectivist view, Same World Subjectivism, that accommodates the two main rationales for idealizing: those given by Peter Railton and David Sobel. I also explain why a recent argument from Dale Dorsey (...) fails to show that subjectivists must idealize. Because Same World Subjectivism is a plausible non-idealizing view, subjectivists about welfare needn't idealize. (shrink)

Schizophrenia is a severe mental illness affecting sense of identity. Autobiographical memory deficits observed in schizophrenia could contribute to this altered sense of identity. The ability to give a meaning to personally significant events is also critical for identity construction and self-coherence. Twenty-four patients with schizophrenia and 24 control participants were asked to recall five self-defining memories. We assessed meaning making in participants’ narratives and afterwards asked them explicitly to give a meaning to their memories . We found that both (...) spontaneous and cued meaning making were impaired in patients with schizophrenia. This impairment was correlated with executive dysfunctions and level of negative symptoms. Our results suggest that patients’ difficulties in drawing lessons about past experiences could contribute to explain the lack of coherence observed in their life trajectories and their impaired social adjustment abilities. Implications for psychotherapy are also discussed. (shrink)

(2000). ROBERT LESLIE ELLIS AND JOHN STUART MILL ON THE ONE AND THE MANY OF FREQUENTISM. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 251-274.

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact (...) about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement. (shrink)

Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended (...) to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it. (shrink)

PstS and DING proteins are members of a superfamily of secreted, high‐affinity phosphate‐binding proteins. Whereas microbial PstS have a well‐defined role in phosphate ABC transporters, the physiological function of DING proteins, named after their DINGGG N termini, still needs to be determined. PstS and DING proteins co‐exist in some Pseudomonas strains, to which they confer a highly adhesive and virulent phenotype. More than 30 DING proteins have now been purified, mostly from eukaryotes. They are often associated with infections or with (...) dysregulation of cell proliferation. Consequently, eukaryotic DING proteins could also be involved in cell–cell communication or adherence. The ubiquitous presence in eukaryotes of proteins structurally and functionally related to bacterial virulence factors is intriguing, as is the absence of eukaryotic genes encoding DING proteins in databases. DING proteins in eukaryotes could originate from unidentified commensal or symbiotic bacteria and could contribute to essential functions. Alternatively, DING proteins could be encoded by eukaryotic genes sharing special features that prevent their cloning. Both hypotheses are discussed. (shrink)

Se intenta mostrar como los nuevo planteamientos que se estan haciendo en las ciencias naturales y sociales, permiten hallar una fundamentación científica para la lingüística textual.

I argue that the distinction between monism and pluralism about well-being should be understood in terms of explanation: the monist affirms (but the pluralist denies) that whenever two particular things are basically good for you, the explanation of their basic goodness for you is the same. I then consider a number of arguments for monism and a number of arguments for pluralism.

Judgments about how well things are going for people during particular periods of time, and about how well people’s entire lives have gone or will go, are ubiquitous in ordinary life. Those judgments are about well-being—or, equivalently, welfare or quality of life. This article examines the concept of well-being and the related concepts of prudential value and disvalue (i.e., goodness or badness for someone). It distinguishes these concepts from ones with which they might be conflated, exhibits some of the roles (...) they play in ethical thought, and examines some attempts to analyze or define them. (shrink)

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem (...) that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects’ favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views. (shrink)

It has become commonplace to distinguish enumerative theories of welfare, which tell us which things are good for us, from explanatory theories, which tell us why the things that are good for us have that status. It has also been claimed that while hedonism and objective list theories are enumerative but not explanatory, desire satisfactionism is explanatory but not enumerative. In this paper, I argue that this is mistaken. When properly understood, every major theory of welfare is both enumerative and (...) explanatory. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the basic goods and bads whose presence in a person's life determines how well she is faring. Monism is the view that there is only one basic good and one basic bad. Pluralism is the view that there is either more than one basic good or more than one basic bad. In this paper, I give an argument for pluralism that is general in the sense that it does not purport to identify any basic (...) goods or bads. If I am right, then even if you cannot name a single basic good or bad, you can know that pluralism is true. (shrink)

In this article, the introduction to the book of Kitāb al-Mulakhkhas al-Muwatta' by Qābisī (d. 403/1012), one of the hadith scholars of Maghrib geography, is discussed. The author wrote this work in order to bring together the continual documents in the Ibn al-Qāsim narra-tion of Mālik b. Anas' (d. 179/795) al-Muwatta. In the introduction, the author first stated the purpose of the writing of Kitāb al-Mulakhkhas al-Muwatta''s and the method followed in the work. Namely, he states that he compiled this (...) work to respond to the demands of those who asked him to bring together the hadiths of Mālik b. Anas, whose chain is complete. In the compilation of the work, he was content with the only narration of Muwatta. He followed the method of collecting the musnad hadiths in this narration, the ones with clear continuous. However, he preferred not to include the narrations that were closed in his continuous in his work. After this information, the author has included some issues of hadith methodology in the introduction part. The main purpose of the study is to determine the concepts and subjects of the hadith methodology that he discussed in this section. In this context, firstly, information about Qābisī's life was given, and his education was mentioned. Then, some information about the features of the work in question is presented. Afterwards, the concepts of hadith methodology that he mentioned in the introduction of his work and his explanations on these issues were examined under separate headings. Although he is encouraged to narrate hadiths in this introduction, he provides information about the refraining of many hadith transmissions, the conditions of endurance of hadith, the words of the narration considered as 'muttasil and munqati', the narration with the meaning of the hadiths and the lahn in the hadith. When the approaches of Qābisī on these issues are examined, it is revealed that he tends towards the views of the Mālikī school, which he is a follower of and Imam Mālik. For this reason, the parts in which he adopted Mālik’s approaches and tended to explain the issues by referring to him are mentioned. (shrink)

Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been (...) thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one’s desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare. (shrink)

Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...) obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion. (shrink)

In Turkey, there was no legal regulation of research on human beings until 1993. In that year “the amendment relating to drug researches” was issued. The main objectives of the regulation are to establish a central ethics committee and local ethics committees, and to provide administrative control.There are no compulsory clinical ethics lectures in the medical curriculum, so it is also proposed that research ethics committees play a central educational role by helping physicians to be aware of moral problems and (...) by contributing to the training of research teams. (shrink)

My goal in this paper is to see the extent to which judgment aggregation methods subsume meta-analytic ones. To this end, I derive a generalized version of the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem, the aggregative implications of which have been widely exploited in the area of rational choice theory, but not yet in philosophy of science. I contend that the generalized CJT that I prove below is useful for modelling at least some meta-analytic procedures.

Ubûdî, who is known to had lived in Egypt at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, is one of the Gulsheni dervish poets. What is known about the life of this secluded poet, whose name is not mentioned in the tazkiras and biographical sources, is due to his work called Menâkıb-ı Ev-liyâ-yı Mısr (Legends of Egyptian Saints). He has another 359 couplet mathnawi on the virtue of knowledge and action, and the ugliness of (...) ignorance and laziness. This masnavi, which will be introduced by presen-ting its text here, has been brought into being with quotations and translations from verses and hadiths. In the masnavi, which has the integrity of the subject, it is mentioned about the virtues of studying science and acting by avoiding ignorance and laziness as a religious obligation. In this article, after briefly menti-oning the life, works and poems of Ubûdî-i Gülşenî, his mathnawi about wisdom and the virtue of action is introduced and evaluations are made about its language, form and content features. In this mathnawi, which was written in a religious-didactic style, the wisdom and virtues of learning are mentioned and advice is given from time to time. In the last part of the article, the text of Ubûdî's masnavi on the virtue of knowledge and action and the ugliness of ignorance and laziness is given, and the translations and sour-ces of the quotations made from the verses and hadiths in the text are presented and the poet's references and references are revealed. (shrink)

Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper (...) introduces a new view, Asymmetrism, on which you sometimes benefit at the time of desire and sometimes benefit at the time of object. On this view, if the time at which you have a desire is later than the time at which its object obtains, then you benefit at the time of the desire. On the other hand, if the time of object is later than the time of desire, then you benefit at the time of object. Three arguments are given for the conclusion that Asymmetrism is superior to the Time of Desire and Time of Object views. It is argued that Asymmetrism and Concurrentism are the most credible answers to the timing question. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 2, February 2022.

When Philip Sidney defends poetry by defending the methods used by poets and lawyers alike, he relies on the traditional association between fiction and legal procedure--an association that begins with Aristotle. In this study Kathy Eden offers a new understanding of this tradition, from its origins in Aristotle's Poetics and De Anima, through its development in the psychological and rhetorical theory of late antiquity and the Middle Ages, to its culmination in the literary theory of the Renaissance. Originally published (...) in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Din-bilim ilişkisi tarihsel süreçte olduğu gibi günümüzde de tartışılmaya devam etmektedir. Hristiyan Avrupa’sında ortaya çıkan tartışmaların İslam dünyasını da etkilediği bir vakıadır. İslam kelamcıları, İslam dini ile bilim arasında bir çatışmanın olmadığı genel kabulüyle hareket ederler. Özellikle bu noktada kelamın vesâil alanı, metafiziğin desteklendiği alan olarak kabul görmektedir. Modern dönemde vesâil alanında önemli bilimsel çalışmaların olduğu görülmektedir bunlardan biri de Nöroteolojidir. Nöroteoloji, davranışı nöral (sinirsel) temelde inceleyip açıklamaya çalışan bilim dalıdır. Bu noktada özellikle dindarlığın nörolojik temelleri ve evrimsel işlevi hakkında (...) önemli bilgiler sunmaktadır. Bu çalışmada kelamın en önemli tartışma konularından biri olan kesb nazariyesi, Nöroteolojik açıdan Benjamin libet deneyiyle değerlendirilmektedir. Deney sonuçları yayınlandığında o güne kadar felsefe ve bilim dünyasında tartışılagelen insanın irade özgürlüğü meselesine yeni bir tartışma zemini hazırlamıştır. Özellikle Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışının da ciddi tartışmalara sebebiyet verdiği bilinmektedir. Allah’ın mutlaklığı açısından ele alınan bu düşünce, insan özgürlüğü ve sorumluluğunu ortadan kaldırır düşüncesiyle eleştirilmiştir. Ancak Benjamin libet deneyinin, Eş’ârî’nin kesb anlayışına uygun veriler içermesi dikkat çeken bir husus olarak göze çarpmaktadır. (shrink)

The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says that what is basically good for a subject is the satisfaction of his desires. One challenge to this view is the existence of quirky desires, such as a desire to count blades of grass. It is hard to see why anyone would desire such things, and thus hard to believe that the satisfaction of such desires could be basically good for anyone. This suggests that only some desires are basically good when satisfied, and that (...) desire satisfactionists owe us an account of which desires these are, and why. In "Quirky Desires and Well-Being," Donald Bruckner proposes such an account: a desire is welfare-relevant (i.e., such that its satisfaction would be basically good for its subject) if and only if and because its subject could describe its object in a way that makes it comprehensible what about the object attracts him or appeals to him. We are inclined to view quirky desires as welfare-irrelevant because we assume that their objects cannot be described in such a way. But if there were a quirky desire whose object could be so described by the subject whose desire it is, then this desire would be relevant to that subject's welfare. I will argue that while Bruckner's view delivers plausible verdicts about the cases to which it is meant to apply, its account of what makes a desire welfare-relevant is unmotivated and implausible. Desire satisfactionists can retain what is plausible about his view while endorsing a better explanation of why welfare-relevant desires have that status if they accept the following account instead: a desire is welfare-relevant if and only if and because something about its object attracts, or appeals to, the subject who has the desire. (shrink)

The current debate that surrounds the issue of patient rights and the transformation of health care, social insurance, and reimbursement systems has put the topic of patient responsibility on both the public and health care sectors' agenda. This climate of debate and transition provides an ideal time to rethink patient responsibilities, together with their underlying rationale, and to determine if they are properly represented when being called `patient' responsibilities. In this article we analyze the various types of patient responsibilities, identify (...) the underlying motivations behind their creation, and conclude upon their sensibleness and merit. The range of patient responsibilities that have been proposed and implemented can be reclassified and placed into one of four groups, which are more accurate descriptors of the nature of these responsibilities. We suggest that, within the framework of a free-market system, where health care services are provided based on the ability to pay for them, none of these can properly be justified as a patient responsibility. (shrink)

A cognitive architecture aimed at cumulative learning must provide the necessary information and control structures to allow agents to learn incrementally and autonomously from their experience. This involves managing an agent's goals as well as continuously relating sensory information to these in its perception-cognition information processing stack. The more varied the environment of a learning agent is, the more general and flexible must be these mechanisms to handle a wider variety of relevant patterns, tasks, and goal structures. While many researchers (...) agree that information at different levels of abstraction likely differs in its makeup and structure and processing mechanisms, agreement on the particulars of such differences is not generally shared in the research community. A dual processing architecture has been proposed as a model of cognitive processing, and they are often considered as responsible for low- and high-level information, respectively. We posit that cognition is not binary in this way and that knowledge at any level of abstraction involves what we refer to as neurosymbolic information, meaning that data at both high and low levels must contain both symbolic and subsymbolic information. Further, we argue that the main differentiating factor between the processing of high and low levels of data abstraction can be largely attributed to the nature of the involved attention mechanisms. We describe the key arguments behind this view and review relevant evidence from the literature. (shrink)

We examine the philosophical disputes among computer scientists concerning methodological, ontological, and epistemological questions: Is computer science a branch of mathematics, an engineering discipline, or a natural science? Should knowledge about the behaviour of programs proceed deductively or empirically? Are computer programs on a par with mathematical objects, with mere data, or with mental processes? We conclude that distinct positions taken in regard to these questions emanate from distinct sets of received beliefs or paradigms within the discipline: – The rationalist (...) paradigm, which was common among theoretical computer scientists, defines computer science as a branch of mathematics, treats programs on a par with mathematical objects, and seeks certain, a priori knowledge about their ‘correctness’ by means of deductive reasoning. – The technocratic paradigm, promulgated mainly by software engineers and has come to dominate much of the discipline, defines computer science as an engineering discipline, treats programs as mere data, and seeks probable, a posteriori knowledge about their reliability empirically using testing suites. – The scientific paradigm, prevalent in the branches of artificial intelligence, defines computer science as a natural (empirical) science, takes programs to be entities on a par with mental processes, and seeks a priori and a posteriori knowledge about them by combining formal deduction and scientific experimentation. We demonstrate evidence corroborating the tenets of the scientific paradigm, in particular the claim that program-processes are on a par with mental processes. We conclude with a discussion in the influence that the technocratic paradigm has been having over computer science. (shrink)

Since 9/11, the possibilities for pluralism and tolerance have been severely tested by a discourse of terrorism and security. The development of an intelligent and cosmopolitan understanding between religious communities in Europe and America has been compromised by a range of legal and political responses to terrorism. While the debate about the berqa has clearly indicated the problems relating to Muslim cultural differences, we argue that legal pluralism and in particular the question of Shari’a tribunals may prove to be a (...) more decisive test of Western multiculturalism. This article examines the many criticisms raised against religious arbitration in domestic affairs and considers the presence of the Shari’a at various levels of society, claiming that the evolution of Sharia-mindedness is compatible both with a faith-based life and with liberal ideals. However, the problem with religious courts lies elsewhere, namely with the fragmentation of social life and the erosion of citizenship. The article concludes by examining the prospects and problems of Turkish entry into the European Union with special reference to the domestic policies of the Justice and Development Party. (shrink)